## 1

People always worry whether reparations are forward looking or backward looking.

But naw dawg. We could do both.

If you think about it, [puts glasses behind head]...we can do both.

#Tomasiswag

## 2

Ugh, Tyler Gamble, how low will your speaks be  
Vote neg on this rap so I know you won’t beat me  
Tyler is a troll whose about to get rolled  
I woulda kicked your ass if you had attempted to bowl  
I bowl like I’m doin prefs, so many strikes  
My swag is a bike and your case is a trike

[Whip whip] that alone describes you

Your loss is written on the board man the ballot inscribes you

Play The Sup Homie Mixtape – #tomasihistory

## 3

Neg gets RVIs. Reverse voter irony.

First, it’s most reciprocal. He can win on irony, so I should, too.

Second, RVIs are key to compensate for the time I had to spend responding to irony. Otherwise, I’m at a disadvantage.

Third, RVIs are key to prevent irony from being run as time suck. Otherwise, it’s a no risk voter for the aff.

## 4

A. The aff must spec the enslavers and the enslaved.

B. He doesn’t.

C. Standards

1. Justice. Justice is bipolar so you gotta spec the individuals.   
  
Justice comes first on theory because if justice didn’t matter then the res would be nonsensical so presumption. Presume neg because Hooters is more likely false than true.

## 5

#Tomasiswag is good

Swag is the root cause of war.

**Armah 13** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

Resolution approved. **The politics of swag**ger **led to** Wednesday's **Senate** Foreign Relations **Committee authorizing** a limited **U.S.** military **intervention in Syria**. The committee voted 10-7 in favor of a compromise resolution that sets a 60-day limit on any engagement in Syria and bars the use of U.S. troops on the ground for combat operations. The stage for a debate in the full Senate next week on the use of military force is officially set. The drumbeat towards that vote became less about fact and more about framing and narrative. The narrative was of absolutes: Go to war or look like a punk by doing nothing. The framing emerged as the President drew a red line around the use of chemical weapons by Syria president Bashar al Assad against the Syrian people, and told Syria to observe that line or else. (Although now a back and forth has begun about who actually drew that red line - the President now says he did not draw it, the world did.) That red line became the launch pad for this politics of swagger. The President was then subjected to a political onslaught from neo Cons and some elements of the Left - including former President Bill Clinton - about being 'weak', a punk, a wuss, a fool, once the line was crossed. Here was a president who killed Osama bin Laden and Libyan former leader Colonel Maummar Gadafi - as Eli Lake of the Daily Beast said sarcastically on 'All in With Chris Hayes' 'Who do you have to kill around here to not be accused of being a punk?" There is another irony, so far unsaid. Barack Obama is America's first African American president. He is a black man. America's relationship with black men has long been one where they were considered threat, to be feared, poised to commit violence and yet the routine accusation against this first black president is of being weak, lacking swag, lacking the balls to act - invoking the absence of a John Wayne, get-it-done hyper masculinity. Take a walk back from president to senator. When President **Obama** ran for that historic 2008 election, the then senator **said** he didn't just want to end the war in Iraq, **he wanted to "end the mindset that got us into** the **war in the first place." That mindset is a politics of swag**ger**.** Phyllis Bennis, a Fellow at the Institute for Public Policy and author of 'Challenging Empire: How People, Governments and the UN Defy Its Power' said during our interview: "The point is, this is the George Bush line post 9/11; we either go to war or let them get away with it. It's a false dichotomy to talk about military force or nothing.' Bennis agrees **this politics of swag emerges due to** what she calls 'face-saving' post the drawing of red lines and the President then submitting to the haranging from political voices. She explains there has been a **'militarization of foreign policy of diplomacy'.**

Denying that war is good destroys value to life

**Hillman 4** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

When Neville Chamberlain and his umbrella returned from Munich in 1938 after utterly failing to grasp the nature of Hitler, he told the British people he had achieved peace in our time and that now everyone should "go home and get a nice quiet sleep." These pages are thick with death in order to disturb the peace. The worst of war is that it ends in peace, that is, it absents itself from remembrance, a syndrome Chris Hedges calls "collective or blanket amnesia," beyond understanding, beyond imagining. "Peace is visible already," writes Marguerite Duras. "It's like a great darkness falling, it's the beginning of forgetting." **I will not march for peace**, nor will I pray for it, **because it falsifies all it touches**. It is a cover-up, a curse. **Peace is simply a bad word**. "Peace," said Plato, "is really only a name." Even if states should "cease from fighting," wrote Hobbes, "It is not to be called peace; but rather a breathing time." Truce, yes; cease-fire, yes; surrender, victory, mediation, brinkmanship, standoff-these words have content, but peace is darkness falling. When peace follows war, the villages and towns erect memorials with tributes to the honor of the fallen, sculptures of victory, angels of compassion, and local names cut in granite. We pass by these strange structures like obstacles to traffic. **Even** the **immediate presence of war's aftermath**, the rubble of London, the rubble of Frankfurt, the desolation through Russia, the Ukraine, **become unremarkable to** its **citizens in the anesthesia of peace**. The survivors themselves enter a state of unperturbed quiescence; they don't want to talk about it. The dictionary's definition, an exemplary of denial, fails the word, peace. Written by scholars in tranquillity, the definition fixates and perpetuates the denial. **If peace is merely an absence of**, a freedom from, **it is** both an **emptiness and** a **repression**. A psychologist must ask how is the emptiness filled, since nature abhors a vacuum; and how does the repressed return, since it must? **The emptiness left by repressing war from the definition of peace bloats it with idealizations-a**nother **classic defense mechanism. Fantasies of** rest, of calm security, **life as "normal**,**"** eternal peace, heavenly peace, the peace of love that transcends understanding; peace as ease (shalvah in the Hebrew Bible) and completeness (shalom). **The peace of** naivete, of **ignorance disguised as innocence**. Longings for peace become both simplistic and utopian with programs for universal love, disarmament, and an Aquarian federation of nations, or retrograde to the status quo ante of Norman Rockwell's apple pie. These are the options of psychic numbing that "peace" offers and which must have so offended Jesus that he declared for a sword. To dispel such quieting illusions, writers along with those hounded by Mars roil the calm. The pages are thick with death because writers do not hold their peace, keep silent, play dumb. Books of war give voice to the tongue of the dead anesthetized by that major syndrome of the public psyche: "peace."

## 6

Misnumbering bad

## 7

Counterplan Text: The United States federal government should devote the entirety of the 2014-15 federal budget to creating Roko’s Basilisk.

It competes – cash-based reparations would cost a shit ton of money that we can’t use to build Roko’s Basilisk

**Vinik 5-21** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

As Coates explains in his piece, reparations must compensate African Americans for more than just the centuries of slavery in the United States. After slavery was abolished, whites frequently lynched black Americans and seized their property. A 2001 Associated Press investigation, which Coates cites, found 406 cases where black landowners had their farms seized in the early-to-mid 20th century—more than 24,000 acres of land were stolen. Housing discrimination, which has been one of the largest obstacles to African Americans' building wealth, still exists today. Larry **Neal, an economist at** the **U**niversity of **Illinois, calculated the difference between** the **wages** that **slaves would have received** from 1620 to 1840**, minus** estimated **maintenance costs spent by slave owners, and reached** a total of **$1.4 trillion in 1983 dollars. At** an **annual** rate of **interest of 5 percent, that’s more than $6.5 trillion in 2014—just in lost wages**. In a separate estimate in 1983, James **Marketti calculated it at $2.1 trillion, equal to $10 trillion today**. In 1989, economists Bernadette Chachere and Gerald Udinsky estimated that labor market discrimination between 1929 and 1969 cost black Americans $1.6 trillion. **These estimates don’t include** the **physical harms of slavery, lost educational and wealth-building opportunities, or** the **cost of** the **discrimination that persists today**. But it’s clear the magnitude of reparations would be in the trillions of dollars. For perspective, the federal government last year spent $3.5 trillion and GDP was $16.6 trillion.

Roko’s basilisk is an omnipotent AI that could punish us for not assisting it

**RationalWiki 13** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Roko's basilisk is a proposition that says** an **all-powerful a**rtificial **i**ntelligence from the future **may retroactively punish those who did not assist in bringing about its existence. It resembles a futurist version of Pascal's wager**; an argument used to try and suggest people should subscribe to particular singularitarian ideas, or even donate money to them, by weighing up the prospect of punishment versus reward. Furthermore, the proposition says that **merely knowing about it incurs the risk of punishment**. It is named after the member of the rationalist community LessWrong who most clearly described it (though he did not originate it).

Timeless decision theory is true

**Yudkowsky 10** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

I carefully said that a causal decision agent visualizes a knowable logical inconsistency when he computes the probability p(B$j^aB) \_ 0. A timeless decision agent also visualizes a logical inconsistency when she imagines what the world would look like if her decision computation were to output aAB—because a timeless computation actually outputs aB. A timeless agent visualizes many logically inconsistent worlds in the course of deciding. Every imagined decision, except one, means visualizing a logically inconsistent world. But if the timeless agent does not yet know her own decision, she does not know which visualized worlds are logically inconsistent. Even if the timeless agent thinks she can guess her decision, she does not know her decision as a logical fact—not if she admits the tiniest possibility that thinking will change her answer. So I cannot claim that causal decision agents visualize impossible worlds, and timeless agents do not. Rather causal agents visualize knowably impossible worlds, and timeless agents visualize impossible worlds they do not know to be impossible. **An agent**, in making choices, **must visualize worlds in which** a deterministic computation (**the decision** which is **now progressing**) **returns an output other than the output it actually returns**, though the agent does not yet know her own decision, nor know which outputs are logically impossible.Within this strange singularity is located nearly all the confusion in Newcomblike problems. Evidential decision theory and causal decision theory respectively compute expected utility as follows: u(o)p(ojai) (16) u(o)p(oj^ai) (17) Placed side by side, we can see that any difference in the choice prescribed by evidential decision theory and causal decision theory, can stem only from different probability assignments over consequences. Evidential decision theory calculates one probable consequence, given the action ai, while causal decision theory calculates another. So the dispute between evidential and causal decision theory is not in any sense a dispute over ends, or which goals to pursue—the dispute is purely over probability assignments. Can we say de gustibus non est disputandum about such a conflict? If a dispute boils down to a testable hypothesis about the consequences of actions, surely resolving the dispute should be easy! We need only test alternative actions, observe consequences, and see which probability assignment best matches reality. Unfortunately, evidential decision theory and causal decision theory are eternally unfalsifiable—and so is TDT. The dispute centers on the consequences of logically impossible actions, counterfactual worlds where a deterministic computation returns an output it does not actually return. In evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, and TDT, the observed consequences of the action actually performed will confirm the prediction made for the performed action. The dispute is over the consequences of decisions not made. Any agent’s **ability to make a decision**, and the specific decision made, **is determined by the agent’s ability to visualize logically impossible counterfactuals**. Moreover, the counterfactual is “What if my currently executing decision computation has an output other than the one it does?”, **when the output of the currently executing computation is not yet known**. This is the confusing singularity at the heart of decision theory. The difference between evidential, causal, and TDT rests on different prescriptions for visualizing counterfactuals—untestable counterfactuals on logical impossibilities. An evidential decision theorist might argue as follows: “We cannot observe the impossible world that obtains if my decision computation has an output other than it does. But I can observe the consequences that occur to other individuals who make decisions different from mine—for example, the rate of throat abscesses in individuals who choose to chew gum—and that is just what my expected utility computation says it should be.” A timeless decision theorist might argue as follows: “The causal decision agent computes that even if he chooses aB, then box B will still contain nothing. Let him just try choosing aB, and see what happens. And let the evidential decision theorist try chewing gum, and let him observe what happens. Test out the timeless prescription, just one time for curiosity; and see whether the consequence is what TDT predicts or what your old algorithm calculated.” A causal decision theorist might argue as follows: “Let us try a test in which some force unknown to the Predictor reaches in from outside and presses the button that causes me to receive only box B. Then I shall have nothing, confirming my expectation. This is the only proper way to visualize the counterfactual, ‘What if I chose only B instead?’ If I really did try choosing aB on ‘just one time for curiosity’, as you would have it, then I must predict a different set of consequences on that round of the problem than I do in all other rounds. But if an unknown outside force reached in and pressed the button ‘take both boxes’ for you, you would see that having both boxes is better than having only one.” An evidential agent (by supposition CGTA-negative) computes, as the expected consequence of avoiding gum, the observed throat-abscess rate of other (CGTA- negative) people who avoid gum. This prediction, the only prediction the evidential agent will ever test, is confirmed by the observed frequency of throat abscesses. Suppose that throat abscesses are uncomfortable but not fatal, and that each new day brings with an independent probability of developing a throat abscess for that day—each day is an independent data point. If the evidential agent could be persuaded to just try chewing gum for a few months, the observed rate of throat abscesses would falsify the prediction used inside the evidential decision procedure as the expected consequence of deciding to chew gum. The observed rate would be the low rate of a CGTA-negative individual who chews gum, not the high rate of a CGTA-positive individual who chews gum. A causal decision agent, to correctly predict the consequence even of the single action decided, must know in advance his own decision. Without knowing his own decision, the causal decision agent cannot correctly predict (in the course of decision-making) that the expected consequence of taking both boxes is $1000. If the Predictor has previously filled box B on 63 of 100 occasions, a causal agent might believe (in the course of making his decision) that choosing both boxes has a 63% probability of earning $1,001,000—a prediction falsifiable by direct observation, for it deals with the decision actually made.35 If the causal agent does not know his decision before making his decision, or if the causal agent truly believes that his action is acausal and independent of the Predictor’s prediction, the causal agent might prefer to press a third button—a button which takes both boxes and makes a side bet of $100 that pays 5-for-1 if box B is full. We presume 35. It is falsifiable in the sense that any single observation of an empty box provides significant Bayesian evidence for the hypothesis “Box B is empty if I take both boxes” over the hypothesis “Box B has a 63% chance of being full if I take both boxes.” With repeated observations, the probability of the second hypothesis would become arbitrarily low relative to the first, regardless of prior odds. that this decision also is once-off and irrevocable; the three buttons are presented as a single decision. So we see that the causal agent, to choose wisely, must know his own decision in advance—he cannot just update afterward, on pain of stupidity. If the causal agent is aware of his own decision in advance, then the causal agent will correctly predict $1000 as the consequence of taking both boxes, and this prediction will be confirmed by observing the consequence of the decision actually made. But if the causal agent tries taking only box B, just one time for curiosity, the causal agent must quickly change the predictions used—so that the causal agent now predicts that the consequence of taking both boxes is $1,001,000, and the consequence of taking only one box is $1,000,000. **Only the timeless decision agent can** test **predict**ed **consequences in the intuitively obvious way, “Try it a different way and see what happens.”** If the timeless decision agent tries avoiding gum, or tries taking both boxes, the real-world outcome is the same consequence predicted as the timeless counterfactual of that action on similar problems. Here is another sense in which TDT is superior to causal decision theory. **Only the timeless decision procedure calculates internal predictions that are testable**, in the traditional sense of testability **as a scientific virtue. We do not let physicists quickly switch around their predictions** (to match that of a rival theory, no less), **if we inform them we intend to perform an unusual experiment**. How should we visualize unobservable, impossible, counterfactual worlds? We cannot test them by experience. How strange that these counterfactual dreams—unfalsifiable, empty of empirical content—determine our ability to determine our own futures! If two people wish to visualize different untestable counterfactuals, is there no recourse but to apply the rule of de gustibus non est disputandum? I have so far offered several arguments for visualizing counterfactuals the timeless way: 1. The **counterfactual predictions used by timeless decision agents are directly testable any time the timeless decision agent pleases, because the timeless agent expects that trying the action “just once for curiosity” will return the consequence expected of that action on any similar problem**. 2. A timeless counterfactual is not visibly logically inconsistent, if the timeless agent does not yet know her decision, or if the timeless agent thinks there is even an infinitesimal chance that further thinking might change her mind. 3. A timeless agent uses the same diagram to describe herself as she would use to describe another agent in her situation; she does not treat herself as a special case. 4. If you visualize logically impossible counterfactuals the way that TDT prescribes, you will actually win on Newcomblike problems, rather than protesting the unreasonableness of the most rewarded decision.

Timeless decision theory justifies devoting all of our resources to helping Roko’s basilisk – solves eternal torment

**Auerbach 7-17** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Yet this doesn’t explain why Roko’s Basilisk is so horrifying. That requires looking at a critical article of faith in the LessWrong ethos: **timeless decision theory**. TDT is a guideline for rational action based on game theory, Bayesian probability, and decision theory, with a smattering of parallel universes and quantum mechanics on the side. TDT **has** its **roots in** the classic thought experiment of decision theory called **Newcomb’s paradox**, in which **a superintelligent alien presents two boxes** to you**:** The alien gives you the choice of either taking both boxes, or only taking Box B. **If you take both boxes, you’re guaranteed** at least **$1,000**. If you just take Box B, you aren’t guaranteed anything. But **the alien has another twist: Its supercomputer**, which knows just about everything, **made a prediction** a week ago **as to whether you would take both boxes** or just Box B. If the supercomputer predicted you’d take both boxes, then the alien left the second box empty. **If the supercomputer predicted you’d just take Box B,** then **the alien put** the **$1 million in Box B**. So, what are you going to do? Remember, the supercomputer has always been right in the past. This problem has baffled no end of decision theorists. The alien can’t change what’s already in the boxes, so whatever you do, **you’re guaranteed to end up with more money by taking both boxes** than by taking just Box B, regardless of the prediction. Of course, **if you think that way and the computer predicted** you’d think **that** way, **then Box B will be empty** and you’ll only get $1,000. If the computer is so awesome at its predictions, you ought to take Box B only and get the cool million, right? But what if the computer was wrong this time? And regardless, whatever the computer said then can’t possibly change what’s happening now, right? So prediction be damned, take both boxes! But then … The maddening conflict between free will and godlike prediction has not led to any resolution of Newcomb’s paradox, and people will call themselves “one-boxers” or “two-boxers” depending on where they side. (My wife once declared herself a one-boxer, saying, “I trust the computer.”) I worry less about Roko’s Basilisk than about people who believe themselves to have transcended conventional morality. TDT has some very definite advice on Newcomb’s paradox: Take Box B. But TDT goes a bit further. Even if the alien jeers at you, saying, “The computer said you’d take both boxes, so I left Box B empty! Nyah nyah!” and then opens Box B and shows you that it’s empty, you should still only take Box B and get bupkis. (I’ve adopted this example from Gary Drescher’s Good and Real, which uses a variant on TDT to try to show that Kantian ethics is true.) The rationale for this eludes easy summary, but the simplest argument is that you might be in the computer’s simulation. In order to make its prediction, the computer would have to simulate the universe itself. That includes simulating you. So you, right this moment, might be in the computer’s simulation, and what you do will impact what happens in reality (or other realities). So take Box B and the real you will get a cool million. What does all this have to do with Roko’s Basilisk? Well, **Roko’s Basilisk also has two boxes** to offer you. **Perhaps you**, right now, **are in a simulation** being **run by Roko’s Basilisk**. Then perhaps Roko’s Basilisk is implicitly offering you a somewhat modified version of Newcomb’s paradox, like this: **Roko’s Basilisk** has **told you** that **if you just take Box B,** then **it’s got Eternal Torment in it, because Roko’s Basilisk would really you rather take Box A and** Box **B**. In that case, **you’d best** make sure you’re **devot**ing **your life to** helping **create Roko’s Basilisk!** Because, **should Roko’s Basilisk come to pass** (or worse, if it’s already come to pass and is God of this particular instance of reality) **and it sees that you chose not to help it out, you’re screwed.**

## 8

P1. An enthymeme occurs when someone makes an argument with an unstated but implied conclusion. **Burton** (No Date) writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Enthymeme** The informal method of reasoning typical of rhetorical discourse. The enthymeme is sometimes **defined as a "truncated syllogism" since either the major or minor premise found in** that more formal method of **reasoning is left implied. The enthymeme typically occurs as a conclusion coupled with a reason.** When several enthymemes are linked together, this becomes sorites.

P2. The 1AC uses truncated syllogisms.

C. The aff relies on the validity of enthymemes.

P1. Using enthymemes in argumentation is not an innocent choice.

P2. It is a strategic decision utilized by supposed anti-establishment rhetors like former Grand Wizard of the KKK, David Duke, in his run for governor of Louisiana. **Aden 94**[[8]](#footnote-8)

In a postmodern age, **elements of an argument can be omitted** easily **since audience members** possess and/or **believe in** a larger number of **"common**ly accepted **facts"** (or, "already said fragments"). Moreover, enthymemes--especially in postmodern cultures--encourage individual interpretations. As Medhurst and DeSousa illustrate in their analysis of the enthymematic nature of political cartoons, individuals create their own understandings of these abbreviated forms of public argument. And, as most public arguments in a postmodern age must be condensed to be carried by mediated channels, it stands to reason that **public figures rely on audience members "filling in the blanks"** of these abbreviated arguments. Thus, audiences in postmodern cultures process public arguments, in theory, much the same as Aristotle suggested that classical audiences processed public arguments. Speakers offer arguments that use already accepted notions as foundations, knowing that audiences will take these notions for granted in constructing their understandings of the arguments. While Aristotle may have envisioned more interpretive convergence in his less complex culture, the process of comprehending public arguments in classical and postmodern cultures appears to be remarkably similar in theory.To test this theory in practice, I examine David **Duke's** use of **enthymeme in his** 19 May 1989, appearance on the Donahue television show shortly after his **election to the Louisiana State Assembly**.[1] DAVID DUKE'S ENTHYMEME David Duke **relies on** a number of cultural factors in constructing his enthymeme. First, he recognizes that a number of voters harbor strong **prejudice**stoward people different than themselves. James J. Brady, chair of the Louisiana Democratic Party told the New York Times during Duke's 1991 gubernatorial campaign: "Part of his vote is just a **hard-core racist vote** where if there was some candidate further to the right of Duke they'd be with him. That's **[was] probably 30 percent of his vote"** (Toner A7). Second, **Duke's constant bashing of welfare** programs **and affirmative action appeals to** economically-frustrated **working class white voters** (Toner A1). Pollster Stan Greenberg, for instance, reported finding during the gubernatorial campaign, "great frustration among white men who have not gone to college, whose incomes are dropping in real terms . . ." (Toner A1). Finally, **Duke's "candor" in discussing his beliefs sets him off as** something of an **anti-establishment** figure**.** "GOP consultant Jim Innocenzi says Duke's success is no aberration. 'Everybody knows everything they want to know about Duke . . . from his sex life to face lift, and they don't care,' he says. 'Things are so bad down there that regardless of everything, he at least represents a change'" (Nichols, 1A; ellipses original). Duke's success in planting himself in anti-establishment soil, I argue, is directly related to the first and second factors listed in the previous paragraph, for **the establishment against which Duke rails is** the **government-sponsored** program of incentives to promote **equality.** His anti-establishment rhetorical appeal is actually a sophisticated enthymeme that combines elements of populism, white supremacy, victimage, and mortification. On one level, **Duke displays himself as a champion of the common person** (populism) by attacking government programs like affirmative action and welfare which supposedly limit economic opportunities for whites (victim-age). At a second level, Duke's attacks on minority-targeted programs like welfare and affirmative action, **along with** his **pride in** his **white heritage**, promote prejudice (white supremacy) **but he also accepts** the **blame for white supremacist feelings by repudiating the KKK and calling his past a "youthful indiscretion"** (mortification). Together, **these strategies constitute an enthymeme that allows Duke to appeal to prejudice without overtly doing so.**

C. We must reject the form and logic of enthymemes to prevent the worst forms of aversive racism that go unchallenged throughout society. **Aden 94**[[9]](#footnote-9)

The Enthymeme. Because **Duke's rhetoric** features subjects **deeply ingrained in the American psyche--ethnic origin,** work ethic, **government's role** in society**, etc.--**I argue that he **creates an enthymeme** that omits both a generalization and an inference. Observation: Government actions, especially welfare and affirmative action, hurt whites economically and socially. Generalization: Minorities are the cause, and recipients, of these government programs. Inference: Minorities are the cause of the social and economic problems suffered by whites. I claim that Duke's overall message is an enthymeme because he, like most Americans, must know that some members of his target audience of **white voters will supply the missing generalization and inference.** The generalization is accepted as true by **many white voters**, especially those younger voters who do not possess knowledge of the context that led to the establishment of these programs. Even older white voters can easily **acknowledge that minorities "cause"** these **government programs to continue since the civil rights movement supposedly accomplished its objectives** with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 over a quarter of a century ago. Recent debate over affirmative action, for instance, seems to center on whether it has made up for past prejudice rather than whether it is needed to prevent present prejudice. The inference, then, is a logical conclusion if one accepts as true the observation and generalization so Duke need not utter it. Thus, Duke's only chore in constructing this enthymeme is to persuade his potential supporters of the truth of the observation. Since observations require the smallest inferential leap among the parts of an enthymeme, and **since dissatisfied white voters are looking for populist explanations of their economic condition that provide outside entities as scapegoats, Duke's** observation--and **enthymeme**--likely **find a receptive audience.** With voters young and old, **Duke relies on the "already said" to provide** both the **political cover** he desires and the political response he craves. The political advantages of the enthymeme are numerous. Initially, Duke can appeal to frustrated white voters by illuminating an entity to blame for their current problems while offering a populist-tinged hope for the future. Next, he can appeal to latent and manifest prejudice without creating voter discomfort over their bigotry-tinged votes. **Voters can resolve** any **cognitive dissonance** in favor of high-mindedness**: they are rebelling against government programs not people; they are not articulating the prejudicial inference of the enthymeme--it remains unstated**; and Duke has accepted any remaining blame through mortification. Third, Duke assumes little political risk. He does not state the controversial portions of his enthymeme. He is not forced to argue the inferential leaps between its parts and thus risk exposure. He can also deny white supremacy because he has employed mortification. "And by the way, is David Duke creating the polarization [between ethnic groups], or are these unfair policies of racial discrimination--massive racial discrimination sponsored by the government against white people--is that what's causing the polarization?" Duke ingenuously queries the Donahue audience (Donahue 10).

P1. Debaters should not use enthymemes in argumentation.

P2. As argument scholars, we have a unique role in preventing oppression that cannot be replicated by the media or any other forum.

C. It must start here. **Aden 94**[[10]](#footnote-10)

Such **criticism is necessary**, for even if a public sphere of argument cannot be recovered/created, individuals generating public discourse must be watched by qualified critics. Two concerns, in particular, bear attention. First, speakers who use **truncated arguments** possess plausible deniability because of what is left unsaid. Second, audience members who fail to acknowledge their understanding of the already said may perpetuate their own cynicism. Plausible deniability is not limited to David Duke's socio-economic analysis. The same year that Duke ran for governor, for example, then President George Bush offered a similar enthymeme in opposing the Civil Rights Bill of 1991. Observation: The bill will promote the use of quotas in the workplace. Generalization: Quotas give unearned opportunities to minorities. Inference: Whites' opportunities will be given to minorities if the bill passes. The quota enthymeme contains an observation that can be defended as a logical discussion of a serious issue while its inference preys on prejudice. "Although [Bush's] rhetoric seems to suggest a principled conservative position, his maneuverings suggest a coolly calculated decision to divide the country on the fault line of racial fear" ("The Cynicism" 10). The hypocrisy of the quota enthymeme--Bush's alternative bill also encouraged quotas and his administration regularly utilized them in its hiring practices (Kinsley; "The Cynicism" 10)--marks the cynicism of the Bush technique, and suggests the ease with which speakers can proffer pernicious public arguments while denying malicious intent. Such situations **demand the attention of argument**ation **critics, for most media personalities appear unable to respond effectively to the unsaid. Donahue**, for example, sputtered and **stammered through**out most of **his interview with Duke, exasperated that he was unable to pin his guest down. That media forums generally preclude extended** lines of **questioning**--talk shows take questions from the audience, debates feature reporters with one question per topic, etc.-**exacerbates media personalities' inability to respond to the unsaid.** Donahue's only extended series of questions produced Duke's only major gaffe of the hour-long program: a suggestion that whites are more intelligent than blacks.

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